Liquidity Position

There are lots of measures of liquidity. The classics are the current ratio and the quick ratio, but they've fallen out of favor because they don't include cash flow, a critical component of liquidity. Cash burn is too recent to be classic, even though it's been around for a while. But it's limited to on-balance-sheet sources of liquidity.

The liquidity position is the latest addition to the liquidity analysis toolkit. It has limitations, but we like it because it includes internal and external sources of funds. Here's a short slide show about it.

Off-Balance-Sheet Debt at BT Group

The heavy burden of hidden debt
BT Group, plc, is one of the world’s largest telecommunications companies. Since the telecom crash in 2001, it’s been struggling with operating, management, and reporting problems. You can add financial problems to the list as well.

Its leverage – or “gearing”, as the English put it – is high. Reported debt to capital (adjusted for actuarial losses in its pension plans) is 66%. That’s based on the numbers reported on the company’s balance sheet.


Look beyond the balance sheet, and leverage gets much worse. BT has retirement benefit obligations that exceed pension plan – or “scheme,” as the English say --- assets by £2,870. If you consider that to be debt, leverage increases to 71%. Treat operating leases as a form of debt financing, and BT’s leverage climbs to 75% (capitalizing annual rental expense at 8x).

Off-balance-sheet debt equivalents
What explains the difference between BTs reported leverage and its adjusted leverage? Why treat pension and lease obligations as the equivalents of debt? How do you tell if an off-balance-sheet liability belongs in your leverage analysis?

We use these criteria. To be the equivalent of debt, an obligation has to:

• Be a financial obligation, not money owed to a supplier
• Have an imputed or actual interest rate
• Have a fixed payment schedule
• Allow the holder to demand payment in full on default
• Be a substitute form of capital

By these standards, unfunded pension obligations are debt because they are financial, are discounted at an interest rate, and often have a payment schedule that is enforced not just by pensioners but by government regulators as well. Operating leases are debt because they are another way of financing assets. If BT securitized its trade receivables, that would be another form of off-balance-sheet financing equivalent to debt.

U.S. and international reporting rules are precise about what debt is, but those rules don’t always capture the economic reality of how companies finance themselves. Sometimes reported leverage understates real leverage. That’s the case for BT.

Using Subordination to Define Intercreditor Priority

The November 2009 issue of The RMA Journal, The Journal of Enterprise Risk Management, includes an article entitled "Using Subordination to Define Intercreditor Priority" by Ron Carleton and Tim Delaney of Financial Training Partners. The RMA Journal is published by the Risk Management Association, a leading organization of professional credit, market, and operational risk managers.

Today, with credit portfolios under growing stress, minimizing losses is more important than ever. "Using Subordination to Define Intercreditor Priority" explains the different types of subordination and how lenders can structure debt to protect themselves in case of a default. For a free copy of the article and more information on

Financial Training Partners, visit www.fintrain.com/publications.

Amend and Extend or Amend and Pretend?

In the last 6 months, we've seen a number of "amend and extend" transactions. Typically they involve:

• The extension of the maturity of a term loan and/or revolver (typically for syndicated, non-investment grade loans). This is only for lenders who agree to the extension (i.e. some lenders may keep the original maturity).
• Increasing loan pricing for lenders who agree to extend (to reflect current market conditions and the higher credit risk of the borrower) and an amendment fee.
• Covenant relief for the borrower (reflecting operating performance below original the targets).

Why an Amend and Extend?

During normal economic times, a borrower would do a new syndication as the maturity date for an existing facility approaches. So why are we seeing amend and extend agreements rather than new facilities? Because many of these companies would have a hard time getting a new syndication done. The loan market is much more selective for high risk credits, and many of these companies have high leverage and weak cash flows.

Amend and Pretend?

It is clear why a borrower would want an amend and extend (despite the higher cost) - they get covenant relief and one or two more years to turn around the business and generate cash for debt repayment. But why are lenders agreeing to these transactions? Do they really

believe the borrowers will be able to repay the loans 2 years later, or are they just deferring the day of reckoning - the day when the borrower will need to do a major financial restructuring (or even a bankruptcy) and the lenders will have to write down the value of the loans? Is it an "amend and extend" or "amend and pretend" (that the loan will actually be repaid some day)?

Hovnanian Takes a Half-Step in the Wrong Direction

Getting Better and Worse
The worst seems to be over for the housing industry in the United States. It may even be on the mend. In the competition for building sites, companies with less financial risk will have an advantage. Hovnanian Enterprises, the sixth largest homebuilder in the country, has been doing some interesting financial deals to improve its competitive position

Hovnanian had the highest leverage among its closest competitors. At the end of 2008, the company’s debt-to-capital ratio was 88.7%, while its rivals averaged 66.2%. With competitors buying foreclosed land from banks at historic-low prices, Hovnanian is forced to spend money on debt service instead.

Worse, Hovnanian had even less financial flexibility than the competition. Looking at maturities of debt over the next five years, Hovnanian had 28.3% of its debt coming due, while its competitors had only 23.0%. Worse still, the company’s debt was much more concentrated in a single year, as the chart below shows.

Maximum 1-year debt maturities as a percent of total debt are the highest value for debt maturities over the next five years as a percent of current period total debt.

Having so much of its debt maturities crowded into a single year is a problem for Hovnanian. It has a lot more refinancing risk than the companies it competes with. If its credit quality gets weaker or the capital markets take another dive when all that debt matures, Hovnanian will be in serious trouble.

Less Progress than Meets the Eye
To its credit, Hovnanian saw the problem and did something about it. Through exchanges offers, open market repurchases, and cash tender offers in the first three quarters of 2009, Hovnanian repaid $780 million of its debt. About $271 million of that was debt maturing in the next five years.

Unfortunately, Hovnanian’s efforts reduced leverage but reduced flexibility as well. Maximum 1-year debt maturities actually increased to 37.7% of total debt. The company had more success retiring its longer-maturity debt than the debt coming due in the next five years.

Financial leverage is a risk in its own right, but embedded in leverage is another risk: financial flexibility. And financial risks are closely connected to competitive risk. Good financial strategy manages all of those dimensions of risk effectively. Hovnanian seems still to be struggling to do that.

How to Increase Loan Returns: LIBOR Floors and OID

High Credit Spreads Match High Credit Risk

Since the credit crisis began in the summer of 2007, and especially since the credit markets fell of the cliff in the fall of 2008, we have seen credit spreads in the loan and bond markets increase dramatically. Some investment grade companies today are paying spreads that were reserved for high yield companies just 3 years ago. Of course, the higher spreads correspond with increasing credit risk brought on by the recession and by investors' declining appetite for risk.

Lower LIBOR is Good News for Borrowers ...

One piece of good news for borrowers is the dramatic decrease in LIBOR, the basis over which most corporate loans are priced. Although there have been some disruptions in the LIBOR market (like the fall of 2008), this rate generally tracks the Fed Funds rate. As a result, LIBOR has come down from over 5% before the crisis to well under 1% today.

US$ LIBOR

Source: Bloomberg

... But Loan Investors Still Get Paid

Loan investors, especially institutional investors, feel the pain when LIBOR goes down. So in addition to higher spreads, loan arrangers are using these two structures to increase the returns on term loans (especially Term Loan B's) and jump-start the market:

• LIBOR Floor: Borrower and lender agree that the basis for the loan will be THE GREATER OF actual LIBOR (currently under 0.50%) or the agreed upon floor. Floors in the market today range between 2% and 3%.
• Original Issue Discount (OID): The loan is sold to investors below par and repaid at par. The difference is the OID, which in todays market is anywhere between 1% and 10%. You can think of the OID as another form of an upfront fee for investors.

MBAs Need Credit Training

The job market for recent MBA graduates has changed dramatically. A recent article in Business Week (MBA Jobs: For Some, a Waiting Game) described how some firms are delaying start dates for MBA hires. Job offers, and even interviews, are hard to get.

Shifting Job Prospects for Finance Majors

One of the hardest hit MBA majors has been finance. Business schools are good at teaching traditional corporate finance skills, mostly focused on valuation - cost of capital, discounted cash flow, optimal capital structure, etc. However, with the recession and pull back in capital market activity, not only has the number of finance jobs come down, but the skills needed for the remaining jobs have shifted. While traditional investment banking functions (think mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings) have pulled back, the focus has shifted to the debt markets - analyzing, structuring, trading and investing in corporate bonds and loans.

Bringing the Credit Training Program to Campus

Most large commercial and investment banks have multi-week entry level training programs for their new MBA hires. These programs include credit training - how to analyze and quantify credit risk, and how to structure debt products that satisfy a borrower's financing needs. Some business schools are now bringing portions of this training to their finance students to help them prepare for the debt-focussed jobs in today's economy. For example, Financial Training Partners (www.fintrain.com) recently delivered a four-day "boot camp" on credit analysis, products and structuring at a top rated business school. Students were able to develop and hone their credit skills, and learned to speak the language of debt arrangers, issuers and investors - just what they need for interview season.

How Xerox Fell

In How the Mighty Fall and Why Some Companies Never Give In, Jim Collins lists five stages of corporate decline. We used them to analyze Xerox in our last post. Collins uses behavioral terms to describe how companies falter, not financial measures.

We have a framework for analyzing troubled companies that complements Collins’ approach. It focuses more on financial measures than management behaviors. Ours is a tool for evaluating the symptoms, while Collins’ explains the cause of the disease.

Our Five Stages of Decline
Our financial framework for analyzing a company in decline has five stages.

• Stage 1: Prosperity. A company in this stage is thriving. Sales growth, profitability, and cash flows are all very strong. Liquidity is very high, and leverage is below average for the industry.
• Stage 2: Stability. In this stage, sales growth, profitability, and cash flows are strong. Liquidity is high, and leverage is about average for the industry.
• Stage 3: Difficulty. Sales growth, profitability, and cash flows are decreasing. Liquidity is low, and leverage is above average for the industry and increasing.
• Stage 4: Distress. Sales growth, profitability, and cash flows are negative. Liquidity is very low, and leverage is very high for the industry and increasing.
• Stage 5: Default. Companies in this stage have the same characteristics as Distress. But because they have missed a debt payment, they are in some form of financial reorganization or liquidation.

Xerox in Decline
Xerox is a good example of a company going through most of these stages. Let’s take a look at some key measures as Xerox goes from stability in 1999, to difficulty in 2000, and to distress in 2001.













Xerox’s operating profitability varies some through 1999, but it’s basically stable. In 2000, the trend is much worse, and margins contract in every quarter, ending in a loss – a clear case of difficulty. In 2001, profitability improves on the strength of radical cost cuts. But it remains low, and Xerox remains in difficulty.













Xerox’s debt is stable in 1999. But it increases sharply in 2000 to fund the decline in profits – a sign of difficulty. Although debt decreases in 2001, it shifts from 30% short-term at the beginning of 1999 to 60% by the end of 2001. That is a strong indicator of distress.














Liquidity shows a fall from adequate levels in 1999 (stability) to inadequate levels in 2000 (difficulty). By the end of 2001, it’s reached a dangerously low level (distress). Here we define liquidity position as cash and available committed credit lines less short-term debt and the current portion of long-term debt.

The Company Risk Cycle
We call these five stages the Company Risk Cycle. Comparing the trends in a company’s performance and finances to the Company Risk Cycle gives you a way to anticipate what could happen next. It gives you the early warning signs of credit problems.

Of course, decline is not every company’s destiny. Economic and industry cycles come and go, and companies get worse and better as they do. And companies in trouble on their own often solve their problems and turn around the way Xerox did.

What Makes Companies Fail?

How the Mighty Fall
Jim Collins is among the best researchers and writers on management effectiveness working today. He’s turned his attention from how companies succeed to how they fail. In his new book How the Mighty Fall and Why Some Companies Never Give In, Collins describes five stages of decline.

• Stage 1: Hubris born of success. Success seems automatic, practically an entitlement, and management blinds itself to threats in the market and weaknesses in the company.
• Stage 2: Undisciplined pursuit of more. Without the right resources, leaders chase after more scale, more growth, more acclaim, more of whatever they see as "success."
• Stage 3: Denial of risk and peril. Leaders dismiss the negative, exaggerate the positive, and put a positive spin on the uncertain. They blame external factors for setbacks instead of accepting responsibility.
• Stage 4: Grasping for salvation. When the company goes into a sharp decline, it looks for simplistic solutions -- like a visionary leader, a bold new strategy, a blockbuster product, or a big acquisition -- instead of getting back to basics.
• Stage 5: Capitulation to irrelevance or death. Successive setbacks sap competitive strength, the most capable people leave, and costly false starts sap financial strength.
  

Collins cites Anne Mulcahy’s turnaround at Xerox starting in 2001 as the counter-example to decline. She saw the company’s problems with unflinching clarity, shut down weak businesses to focus on strong ones, and cut costs in spite of the pain. She also restructured the company’s finances, narrowly avoiding bankruptcy.

Xerox's Brush with Death
Xerox may be a case in point for never giving in, but it is also a good example of how a company gets into trouble. In fact, it follows Collins’ stages of decline quite closely.

• Stage 1: Hubris born of success. Xerox created the copier industry, and thanks to its vaunted technological prowess and its famous sales force remained the leader through the mid-1990s. But the large-corporate market became saturated, Xerox was the high-cost producer, and more efficient rivals began eating into its market share.
• Stage 2: Undisciplined pursuit of more. Rather than overhaul its cost structure and cut prices, Xerox tried to grow its way out of trouble by introducing digital copiers and expanding into printers and small copiers for the small-office and home-office markets.
• Stage 3: Denial of risk and peril. Sales growth and profit margins began to shrink. Pricing for digital copiers proved to be much weaker than Xerox expected, and competition in printers and small copiers was ferocious. Xerox blamed economic problems in Russia, Brazil, and parts of Asia instead.
• Stage 4: Grasping for salvation. When growth and profitability fell even more, Xerox’s solution was to bring in Rick Thoman from IBM as CEO. His new strategy was to change from selling copiers to consulting on document processing, and he reorganized the entire sales force to that end. To meet earnings targets, senior managers began manipulating the revenue and expense accounts.
• Stage 5: Capitulation to irrelevance or death. Thoman also tried to cut costs, but at first the cuts created more inefficiencies than they corrected. Inventories shot out of control, and problems consolidating billing centers caused receivables to balloon. Because of the company’s bad accounting, the Securities and Exchange Commission refused to allow Xerox to issue any securities. As its funding dried up, Xerox ran out of liquidity and had to sell assets and renegotiate its bank lines in order to survive.
  

More to Come on Stages 4 and 5 and Risk
Collins looks at decline from a management perspective, but his framework is useful in risk analysis as well. The management mistakes that lead a company to Stage 5 can have dire financial consequences, as they did at Xerox. In our next blog entry, we’ll take a look at a framework for anticipating and evaluating the financial aspects of a company in decline.

Wrangling Term Loan B Investors

According to Bloomberg.com, American Airlines is asking its lenders for a covenant waiver. A conference call was held on June 22 and responses are due by June 25. Why the rush? The covenant would be waived for the quarter ending June 30, so the company wants the amendment done before the end of the quarter.

As we have discussed in earlier entries, many companies are amending their credit agreements to reflect lower than expected operating performance driven by the recession. Airlines have been especially hard hit by the downturn, so the pressure on American's covenants is no surprise. The interesting element of this amendment is the lending group - institutional investors.

Term Loan B

A Term Loan B ("TLB") is a term loan structured for sale to institutional investors, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and prime rate mutual funds. Traditional term loans, called Term Loan A's, are typically originated by and sold to banks. Here are the main differences between the two:

Negotiating Amendments with Institutional Investors

Amendments to corporate loan agreements happen all the time. When the lenders are banks (as is typical for revolvers and TLAs), the relationship between borrower and lender often goes back many years and may include other business, such as cash management or bond underwriting. As a result, banks are often willing to work with borrowers towards a long-term solution (i.e. banks are more willing to grant waivers). TLA banks are often referred to as "relationship lenders."

Institutional investors are "transaction lenders" - their relationship with the borrower often goes no further than the individual loan. As a result, they are often less inclined than banks to grant waivers or agree to amendments.

American Airlines "Pays Up" for its Amendment

American's proposal to its TLB lenders is to waive the fixed charge covenant this quarter and cut it through the loan's maturity in 18 months. In exchange, the spread on the loan would go from 200bp over LIBOR to 400bp, and there would be a new LIBOR floor of 2.5%. This would immediately increase the interest rate on the $435 million loan by about 3.9%, increasing interest expense by over $16 million per year. In addition, the lenders would get a 75 basis point amendment fee, costing American over $3 million. These terms are not unusual in today's market for "B" rated companies like American.